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the relief of symptoms, and the prov1s1on of safe passage. ) 1 "safe 
passage," he meant the support and ready availability of the r ysician 
to his or her patient until death. With this type of motivat m, and 
with consultation with the involved clergy and family, I belie; · we are 
on safe ground. 
We are progressing into the promised land of high technc >gy. We 
should not be. afraid of it. Our ethics must keep pace with <- vancing 
technology. The difference between killing and allowing to 
of motivation. We should never kill. We terminate medic. 
e is one 
heroics 
·ss. This when it is clear that we are only prolonging the dying pro 
decision must be made on each individual case. There ar no easy 
answers. Set before us is life and death. Choose life. 
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The Nature of Man: 
A Philosopher's Viewpoint 
Raphael T. Waters, Ph.D. 
Professor Waters is a philospher at Niagara University in New York. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
a) There . is a great crisis today concerning what we understand by 
the nature of man, which is a reply to the question: "What is a 
man?" 
The effects of this crisis are being felt in the discussion of such 
topics as abortion, euthanasia, death, human rights, the nature of 
society, justice, freedom, and the notion of the common good. 
b)Ideas are important for they influence our whole lives whether 
we like it or not. Our idea of man, for instance, determines what 
will be done with him by his fellow men and also by the society 
in which he lives. To add to the difficulties we are living in a 
. man-centered culture, for he has become the . measure of all 
things. . 
c) In the midst of confusion of definitions of the nature of man, 
springing from a confusion of philosophical systems, one stands 
out above the rest. I am referring to that philosophical teaching 
based on the errors of Immanuel Kant whereby some claim that 
we cannot know the nature of anything and therefore . cannot 
know the nature of man. · 
d) Those who claim that we cannot know what man is, conclude -
as we are seeing in the world of medical ethics -by deciding on 
the. nature of man being what they WANT him to be, e.g., a 
socially-conscious be.ing, or a citizen with meaningful existence, 
etc. Thus we impose an idea on reality instead of discovering rn , . 
than 8 t~e nature. Then as a result of certain fundamental errors, 
be~se ~hilosophers and others reduce .him to a purely social 
. . ~ng, I.e., a being whose whole reason for existence is to be a 
Citizen, to have good Social relations, or otherwise he is not to be 
c~nsidered man. Such a teaching has the seeds of Marxism. The 
8 te becomes the ultimate reality and each man MUST fit in -
or else. 













called empiricism, which r~duces him to a collection o f 
be observed by the senses. We can have no other kn o 
him, according to such teaching, except to know him a. 
of impressions -impressions made on the senses. 
f) A third understanding of the nature of man is to be fo 
traditional philosophy developing over the past 25 
seeking its principles and facts faithfully in external re 
referring to the philosophy of realism as presented 
masterly fashion by St. Thomas Aquinas - the prince 
~sophers. It is with the perennial realism of Aristotle, :--
and all the · great masters within that tradition that I sr 
dealing. 
II. Human Operations . 






.~ty. I am 
a most 
: all phil· 
Thomas 
I now be 
civities of 
8 to what 
from this 
Every science perceives as its special domain the < 
some particular kind of bodily thing in order to determ 
order of beings it belongs. The sciences of man do not diff. 
method of proceeding in a scientific investigation. 
Man has much in common with other living things for 11 ~ them, he 
is capable of immanent activity, whereby he can move .mself and 
· · f egeta· 
benefit from his own actions. Like plants, he has the powE , o v . 
·t· hfe tive operations; like brute animals, he has the powers of ' n~l 1ve t 
for he can sense, has passfons and can do locomotive opF ·a twns. Yef 
he fills a unique place among bodily things for his speci& manner 0 
acting is characterized by rationality. Whatever he does a · man- the 
human actions of which he is capable and which are pro f. er~y hu~r 
- manifest that central characteristic we commonly call ,·atwnal dh e. 
· · h · 11 t k . extraor JO· His highest power of operatwn - t e mte ec - can rna " the 
ary distinctions by abstracting one reality from another. such as 
·· t and can 
color from the flower; can form judgments about reau y , 
reason to obtain new truths. . . . te an 
While the operations of plants and brutes clearly mdlca m 
absence of rational life, man's intellectual activity sets him apart ~:~er· 
all other corporeal entities for it specifies his most fundamental dl 
ence. · · . . . sfrom 
Since the kind of activity of wh1ch any bemg 1s capable flow . is 
· f 1 · deratl0° the being as it is the cause of that _operatw~, care u consl of that 
necessary to discern what operatwns man1fest the nature f r it 
being. For example, a tree is cap~ble of the activities of ~ tr~~r~ugb 
can nutrify itself, grow to perfectwn, and generate offspnng tain 
its reproductive powers. Likewise, the activities of a dog h~ve _ a c~:hed 
peculiarity t_o. t_hat_ parti~ular beast a~d they · a~e to be, dlstl~~y for 
from the actlVItles 1t has m common w1th plant llfe. Man s ca~ he is. 
rational actions, then, is a sure indicator of the kind of being 
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Everything man does when executing human acts manifests rational-
ity. He contemplates the order in the universe and puts order into his 
affairs; he makes distinctions and seeks to understand the causes of 
thil.lgs. He is reflective for he can understand his own reasoning, cor-
rect it, and is thus able to make progress in his knowledge and all that 
he does; 
B. Some Characteristics of Rationality_ 
a) What is this power peculiar to man- this rational life which 
distinguishes him from other bodily natures around him? It is a power 
of the soul -the . power of knowing natures of things, grasping being 
as it is being and not as it is colored, nor possessing qualities of 
hardness, coldness or other sensible aspects. Above all it is the power 
of making progressive judgments through the reasoning process where-
by man can discover new truths from previously known truths. 
Through the knowledge of the comparison of two concepts with a 
third we conclude that the two ideas themselves can be compared. 
b) Rationality receives what it knows through the senses which 
cannot understand, . cannot reflect and cannot have consciousness of 
abstract realities. Indeed, our rational life depends on sensitive life 
and, in fact, implies the operations we know as sensation, passions and 
emotions, vegetative life and even locomotive life, or our power to 
make physical movements. In all of these functions, the intellectual 
life implies the association of the soul with a physical reality we call 
the body. 
· c) The operation of the human intellect manifests above all that 
the human soul belongs to the order of beings known as spiritual 
~tures. This non-materiality is properly termed spirituality and signi-
fies its ability to transcend the material order or the order of bodily 
things. It does not depend on matter as its subject of operation. In 
~ther words there is no organ of the intellect as there is an organ of 
Sight. This can be deduced from its knowledge of immaterial objects 
su~~ as honesty, truth, justice, and the like. This non-materiality or 
spmtuality is characteristic of every kind of intellect whether human 
or- on the supposition that there are other beings above the bodily 
or~er and below the .divine Being- of angelic beings, or the divine 
Bemg. The only dependence on the bodily world for the human intel-
lect is an objective dependence for we get our knowledges through the 
senses and about bodily things . 
· C. Properties of Rationality 
Since the properties of a being are signs of its essence, a study of 
the nature of man should not fail to consider his properties and how 





deal are known as metaphysical properties. They are all unique 1 
and are sure signs of the distinctly human nature he has- wel 
the highest instinctive capacities of any other animal . They ar• 
physical properties, for they are in reality the very same t 
rationality, but viewed from a different perspective or are t l' 
function itself, as applied in a particular field of human endea . 
instance, when we delcare that man is a social animal, we an 
describing the application of his rational life, but in relatio · 
socially organized group and its members. In a word, without 
ity, none of these properties will exist. 
The applications of the life of reason are vast in depth and 
Consider for example the following: 
i) Man is a talking animal because he is rational. 
ii) Man is a laughing animal because he is rational. 
iii) Man is self-corrective because he is rational. 
iv) Man is progressive because he is self-corrective. 











vi) Man is social because he is rational. Some writers W < !d tell us 
that man is man because he is social. This is topsy-tu y philos· 
ophy to say the least . . Their expression is somewr akin to 
this: Man becomes human when he has meaningft relations 
with others in society. Aristotle, 1 however' sees clef: '/ enough 
that man 's whole application to the social order founded 
upon the fact that he is a rational animal as indeed d "S also St. 
Thomas Aquinas. 2 They likewise saw that man is o t whollY 
social, i.e., is not entirely a social animal so that h· would be 
merely an individual and not a person. If man , ts entirely 
social, this would lead us straight to totalitarian i m and the 
total subordination of man to society. No, man is . -;o a whole 
person in himself, above and beyond his sociality . 
vii)Man is a political animal as Aristotle also said. 3 H · gave as the 
reason for this the rational nature of man. 
viii) Man is an economic animal because he is rational Karl Marx 4 
saw this to the exclusion of everything else. He sqw man as a 
worker but failed to realize that man works to avoid w~rk- t~ 
save effort - through making acts of exchange as Anstotle 
and St. Thomas 6 well showed. 
ix) Man is a free being because of his rationality, i. e. , he has fre~· 
dom of the will. The French philosopher Sartre proclaimed thiS 
as if it were the very essence of man. 7 d 
x) Man is contemplative because he is intellective as Plato learne f 
from Socrates. 8 Indeed this teaching lies at the basis of most 0 
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xi) Man is a technical or artistic animal because he is rational. On~ 
does not need to reflect very deeply to s"ee that modern te~hn~· 
ogy demands the application of reasoning in companY With 
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of the instruments possible which extend and render more 
precise the functioning of man's senses and his higher faculties. 
·Each of these properties, together with others too numerous to 
~ention, signifies the presence of reason and its faculty ; the human 
m~ellect. Each of them manifests the complexity of human activity 
w1th all of its distinctions, orderly disposition of thousands of items 
with relations so intricate that one can only hope to become familiar 
with a small part of social and personal affairs. 
These proper operations of man all · have certain characteristics in 
common: 
a) They are immanent activities, that is to say, man does the act 
and benefits from the act. They are not merely transitive acts 
which are characteristic of non-living things whereby the non-
living substance produces an effect in something other than 
itself. What is characteristic of all living things is that what they 
do is for their own benefit. They are, in other words, self-perfec-
tive, inasmuch as they perfect the living being in some way. 
b) The second characteristic of these properties is their common 
foundation in human reason. They are, as said above, the appli-
cation of rationality in one or another order. To talk is to apply 
rationality in social life in order to communicate to others what 
we understand of reality - our judgments, and our reasonings. 
To be scientific is to use one's highest powers 'to draw conclu-
sions about the causes of things, while to be social is to seek 
goods we have in common with other members of the group. 
While the reasonableness of human activity is remarkably 
present, impregnating the myriads of matters which occupy 
man throughout any lifetime, yet another aspect sometimes 
causes many today to raise serious doubts about the presence 
of this rational element. One hears about the irrational in man. 
A defective organ on which the intellect operates, or to put it 
another way, which presents to the intellect initiai knowledge 
of the external reality, can inhibit the due operation of the 
reasoning faculty. Faulty mental life and unbalanced emotional 
states arise on account of the habits built up over a period but 
~ometimes the presence of intellect may be thrown completely 
mto question on account of the failure of some function of the 
brain, wherein is located the organ of the imagination. A very 
Young child does not have the full use of reason on account of 
the slow development of the appropriate instrument- the . 
corte~. The intellect can be proved to be a faculty not depend-
e~t either for its existence or subjectively for its proper opera-
bon on the cerebral cortex. Therefore the non-functioning 
must never be taken as a sign that its presence is lacking. Hence 
to say that an embryo is not yet human because it does not 





manifest its humanity leads us to draw an unwarranted ' mclu· 
sion. In similar fashion, to say that a comatose patient d · ~s not 
display evidence of his thinking powers is not suffici~ tt evi· 
dence for saying that he does not possess rational power Like· 
wise, we can hardly claim that a senile patient lacks th.e acuity 
to judge and think as we do. Furthermore, not usn one's 
reason and acquiescing in violent, emotional outbursts emon· · 
strates a failure to use reason but that is not the sam as not 
having reason. One must always carefully distinguish b• ween a 
power and the exercise of that power. 
· At times there are difficulties to be explained bu l thou· 
sand diffiCulties can never add up to one absurdity! 
III. Human Nature or What a Mari Is 
a) In this era of confused culture, articles and books l Je been 
written about the nature of man, the nature of life and oth1 natures, 
but I have yet to see one of these works which explains whs .s meant 
by a nature. Thus we should at once determine what the p : osopher 
really means by that term "nature." The word comes fro rr., he Latin 
"natus" meaning "born." When we are born, we arrive "nr ,d" or in 
the "na" so the root "na" means born. Being naked, we co with the 
barest essentials or standard issue of equipment, not blue be ties! 
The term "nature" has .this signification then: what so1 -thing has 
within itself (not added to itself) that which enables it to ha' the pow· 
ers of operation which it does have? It is the being with t terence to 
what it can DO. Note what it can DO! For example, to b : a plant or 
have the nature of a plant signifies to be able to DO what · plant can 
· gas do. To be a man o~ to have human nature means to be sw a bem 
to be able to DO what a man can do. . h 
b) But how do we arrive at knowledge of this natu: · ? If eac 
· nature is accompanied by a certain mode of operatio11. t hen .by ~ 
careful study of the mode of operation of that being, we ...: a~ ~nv~ a 
· a knowledge of its nature . This is expressed in the famous prmCJple . 
DO follows BE and the mode of doing follows the mode of being. 
If something does or acts. like silver, it must be silver ; if s o~ethin~ 
. d l'k an It mus does like a dog, it must be a dog. If somethmg oes I e am ' d his 
· l't' h . h e calle be man. Hence we consider those special qua I Ies w IC w . e 
. . . h . man smc properties and which we said charactenzed man as e 1s ' 
they belong exclusively to him . . . EverY 
Such a procedure is not monopolized by philosoph.ers. f o!ll 
· h h ' · · 1 · evident r sCience operates in accordance wit t 1s prmc'lp e as 1s 
the above examples. 
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c) But the philosopher does not rest there! He discovers by a 
pr~cess of very accurate reasoning from infallible principles and the 
facts gathered from reality that the cause within man which enables 
him to DO these things of which he is capable, is something of his 
nature. For what he does be, enables him to do what he does do. The 
same intrinsic principle which makes him be what he is and distin-
guishes him from all other things is the same principle which makes 
him do what he does. His functioning is in terms of his very nature. To 
act like a man presupposes that he is. a man . The shorthand term 
which is employed by philosophers to describe the intrinsic principle 
which forms part of man and which causes him to be what he is, is 
" FORM" and the usual name in the English language given to man's 
form is "SOUL." This should not be misunderstood , for every living 
thing, precisely because. it is living, has a soul. Each has a different 
kind of soul however while man has a unique soul which enables 
him to have' all thos~ special properties he has. Incidentally, other 
names for this vital principle in organisms are used because of the 
penetration of the · English language by Greek and Latin, namely 
psyche in the word " psychology " and anima as in the word " animal," 
used in biological sciences. These terms have the meaning of be-souled 
things. · 
d) We can go further and prove that not only is this soul a part 
of man but that it has a capacity for existing even apart from the 
matter. It has the property of being able to function subjectively and 
even exist as an incomplete principle and apart from its co-principle 
Which is matter. This property depends on its incomplete nature as a 
non-material principle; in other words, as a spiritual substance. It is 
·but a small step then to prove from this its immortality which follows 
from its lack of composition- or its simplicity. This aspect of human 
nature has been · faced from the first attempts to philosophize 25 
centuries ago. · 
In sum, we could say that man consists of two principles: one 
~hich is material, and a co-principle which is spiritual arid therefore 
Immortal, and which is the ultimate reason within man of all that a 
man can have as human all those properties we have named above. 
You will note that I said a co-principle, for it can be showri that 
the two principles of which man is composed, together make him be 
?ne complete substan.ce. This is to say that he has one nature consist-
Ing of one bodily substance. 
e . e) We would be dish~ nest at this stage if we did not adm~t the 
Xlstence of two other explanations of human nature: mechamsm 9 .~d extreme vitalism.Io Mechanism claims that man consists of a un~le of chemical and physical activities. In other words, chemico-~hyslCal .e~planations are sufficient to explain all that a man is and 
fa~es . Thts ts valid as a working principle in experimental sciences but 
ils completely as a philosophical explanation as can be shown. 
MaY,1985 181 
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Extreme vitalism on the other hand recogni~es the need for a 
greater explanation of life but fails on another count. It teach ; that 
there is a soul, but it is trapped within man and, as Rene D f ;artes 
taught, is joined to him at the pineal gland. In this teaching, ~r !Sand 
dogs are merely machines and man alone is a living thing. B\. again 
there is failure to explain the proper activities of the living s .ce no 
account can be given for the immanent actions of man. Mal would 
consist of two whole substances, as if he were related to his b . iy as a 
boy is to his bicycle. This is absurd! · 
f) We are obliged to conclude that man, (although it is di ult to 
comprehend), has to be made up of two principles, one ' which 
exceeds the capacity of the other and this is the only :equate 
explanation of human natuer. It is somewhat easy to prove t '> , using 
the precise methods of philosophical demonstration, but it i. !ifficult 
to grasp how a spiritual principle can be the form of a b( ily sub· 
stance - how matter and spiritual form are united to con1 •ise one 
operative being. But then philosophy comes . face to ee with 
mysteries like any science- but these are not absurdities. M , like all 
corporeal beings, has a nature made up of two principles, 1t in his 
case, one occurs uniquely among living organisms, for it spiritual 
and is the reason he can live the complex life as an individt' and as a 
member of many complex social groups. This description ·f human 
nature is in accord with the facts and can also be shown t o l t he only 
teaching which is in agreement with the facts. This doct ri. ' , coming 
from as far back as the Greek philosopher, Aristotle, right d wn to the 
Present day is known as hylomorphism. 11 It signifies sim '· :y t~at the , . a 
soul causes the body to be an organized unit on account of bemg 
co-principle with it. 
f) Man, then, ca~ be defined· as a rational animal ano (his spelled 
out fully declares man to be a ratiorial, sensitive (having ~.~c• u s es), vege· 
tative, body, with the power of expressing himself with fi, nsitive love, 
and- what is characteristically human: -,intellectual love. . . 
This again implies that man has the power of reasonmg, se~~~~tve 
knowledge, inclinations of his free will, passions, vegetaLive acttvtttes, 
. ~y 
and the power of locomotion, for all of these follow as necess 
accompaniments of rational life. . 
. g) The soul of man is the ultimate reason why he is what he.~ 
and what he does. It is the. cause of all of his perfections and spect 
qualities, and hence is the cause of the dynamic surge within m: 
whereby his whole thrust into reality orginates, his whole thrust. oft ~ 
power of growth towards the ultimate quantity due to h is spectes a~ 
its fullness of being. The soul puts a great urge into man causing ht~ 
to reproduce as Freud saw when he described that urge called sexu~ 
ity even though he did not understand the metaphysics of hUill: e 
sexuality. The effect of th~ human soul right from t~~ ~tart is to SJ1~f 
him toward developing hts proper shape, size, actlVltles, etc. . 
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which properly belong to him. 
. h) But the unity of that being- the diverse urges whether of the 
whole being for its existence, the maintaining of its existence through 
the . powers of nutrition and growth, the reproduction of the species 
through the power of generation, the . appetite for the goods which 
are. plea~ing to our nature, the appetite of the will for the complete 
satisfactiOn of man, and the appetite of the intellect for truth - all are 
unified in the one being, man, on account of the unity of matter and 
form, body and soul. Man's soul is the final principle decreeing that all 
be ~or the one existential centre -his whole being. 
. 1) One more thing needs to be said about the matter of which man 
Is com·posed. Matter according to itself, (as the philosopher under-
stands matter; not as the scientist understands it) when left to itself 
~?not be. Without form matter is no thing. It is the form which gives ~tIts reality, determines what that thing is to be. It is the form which 
Imposes. on living things that they be, that they be living, that they 
necessanly have organs to be organized. It is the form that determines 
the proper development of the matter for each thing so that it has the 
body of a tree, a dog, a kangaroo, or a man. 
Hence a certain mode of matter is proper to man for the form det · · ' 
ermmes that. Furthermore, at conception the form and matter 
co . . ' 
me Into bemg together and the proper function of the parents throug~ appropriate parts of them, which we know as sperm and 
~vum, Is to prepare suitable matter which demands or h~s an urge for 
t~m~ soul. Whenver there is a certain mode of organization present: 
re Is .h~man soul, for this is an apt and demanding matter for that 
:\It IS m ~ii'ect proportion to that soul. This organization appropri-
0 man IS to be observed at conception , therefore one cannot 
reasonably doubt the humanity of the being at that point. 
IV. Some Corollaries Which Follow from Our Teaching 
Concerning the Nature of Man 
SO a)t ·The human soul cannot evolve from matter as seems to be me lllles sug t d . . . far ges e m evolutionary literature. The power of the soul 
ope e~~eeds the potentialities of matter both for its being and its manr~f IOns. Hence, to Claim that the greater comes from the lesser is 
I estly absurd b t h human d . , u some w o s1.,1ggest that the embryo becomes 
what th 0 • m some way, propose such an absurdity. One wonders 
their 1 ~y mean by human and what kind of evidence they have for 
showc alms. Contemporary biology, and especially embryology, has zygot~ :s tha~ there is sufficient microscopic organization within the 
based 0 testify that human soul is present notwithstanding the errors 
tion w~~~n the mac~oscopic biology of earlier teachers. The propor-






to teach us that the human soul is present. quantity of the embryo or fetus (biological names for the youngest 
b) But it might be objected that those speciarfunctions wh :h we men) causes no substantial change but on the contrary, the tiniest 
claimed above for man are sometimes absent and hence the oq mism babe in the womb is as much a man as the most perfectly developed 
ceases to be human. Sometimes man does not use his functic .s but Olympic athlete . They have specific identity. This, in fact, is· what is 
this would hardly be reason enough to deny that he has the Jower meant by the equality of men. In similar vein, it can be argued that a 
which, under the correct circumstances, woulq enable him use man asleep is as much a man as one who is wide awake and able to use 
them. Damage to the organ, need for rest, comatose sta •s are .1 all his faculties. Hence, to suggest that we ought to destroy someone 
instances where man does not use his higher operative pow. s. His · because he is not using his operative powers or even cannot use them, 
rationality may appear to cease to function, but this is not · deny is to suggest that we destroy a human person. Man is not just a useful 
that the human soul still possesses those faculties. Thus we ·annot thing, disposable for our convenience. 
deny the presence of a human soul! No biologist would claim 1at the d) An important difference between the various sciences which 
resting stage of a zygote, for instance, is sufficient reason for aiming deal with man should be indicated, for in those disciplines which we 
a . change of species. The comment that Karen Quinlan is a " 4etable call the empirical sCiences; with their dependence on observation as 
merely means that she can perform vegetative functions onl;. But in the final arbiter of truth, we can obtain knowledge of what is common · 
the popular mind, this appears to mean that she is no IongE human among men expressing their conclusions in truths which can attain a 
and therefore can be slaughtered. While this is not the place o enter high degree of probability. Theirs is not the function of specifying the 
into the moral questions involved, we must be careful at all tmes to natures of things, but they determine the latter merely in terms of the 
distinguish between human powers themselves and the ei rcise of appearance of those natures. For instance, we commonly accept that 
those powers. In such cases the human soul with its compiE' powers water boils at 100 degrees centigrade but we should be cautious 
of operation is present and thus one is still a man, notwithsta ding the enough to realize that some factor ,might be present~ either a minute 
lack of the exercise of the powers in those operations whid Jroperly quantity of an element so far undetected, or some condition whose 
belong to each of us. P~esence has escaped our attention- which factor , on being removed, 
c) Man is either a rational animal, or he is not. Bill Smit is either will permit water to boil at its true level of "x" degrees. In other 
human, or he is not. The evidence shows that without any c ubt man words, no observable evidence can show the necessity of this predicate 
is, by nature, a rational animal. Such a contemporary vie ·· that he ::boils at 100 degrees centigrade" being attached to this subject 
becomes human as the result of social relationships, or is r .> t human water." 
until birth, or even is not alive until birth, is utter nonsense, o say the . On the other hand, the philosophical treatment of the nature of 
least, and is in direct conflict with what can be demonstrat e · in sound man depends on an intelligible method in which the fact of certain 
philosophy, as has been summarily outlined above. mra~des of movement are considered in the light of utterly certain, 
At the other end of the scale of life, to suggest that m, individual tiona! principles. For we must know the nature of man- not the 
ceases to be human· because he no longer has a useful exist• nee, or no ap~arances of the nature as is determined in experiment, for instance 
longer has a meaningful existence, or cannot relate to reali t; , and that -.m order to know what is normal. Hence, im important distinction 
he thereby ought to be released from his .human or non-human extsf ~JU1~ts between the common and the normal. It might be common to tence, indicates a failure to take fully into account the na~uret~e e tberately abort a child, for men to steal, for men to practice homo-
humanity as well as the nature of human society, not to mentwn . ::-ality? but never~heless, none of t?ese constitutes _a _normal state of 
whole purpose of human existence. . . h · sta ' _whtch conclustori can only be discovered on arnvmg at an under-
It is quite evident that, from the moment of his conceptiOn, eac at ndmg: of his nature. 'l'hose empirical scientists who claim to arrive 
man acq).lires the human s~ape and gradually increasing siz~ proper ~ so what 1s normal, are operating outside their field . The confidence of 
his species through the power of growth. But such quantitative aspec f to ~e, c_onfidence which is un-warranted by the method, in their ability 
are not to be confused with the substance of man . The power ~ tru Pec~fy what ought to be, manifests a lack of understanding of the 
growth is a quality of the soul- something added to the soul- wh~: e ObJect of their science. 
the soul itself constitutes a part of the substance. The effect of t f 
soul is the life caused in the organism while the object of the power ° Conclusion 
growth is the quantitative aspects effected. . rn 
It would b.e false to claim that through ·growth , the orgam\ 
acquires a new species, as if a non-man became man . The increase 1 
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in sM~y of those ideas about man, his manner of existence, his place 
OClety, and his destiny are all contingent upon a true understand-







ing of his nature. Ideas have consequences and we must ne" ~r forge! 
that, as the famous Aristotle said, a small error in principle ~ads to a 
great error in the conclusion. Elaborate a false teaching abo t whata 
man is and the consequences are disastrous as we are be ginn og to see 
today. The philosopher seeks the ultimate causes of realit) and first 
among the realities which immediately concern his specula on is h 
own being and its existence. Incorrect answers to his quest! ·ns abo¢ ~ 
man can lead to disorders in several fields such as educ .ion, ana · 
psychiatry -as Anna Terruwe, the Dutch psychiatrist, woul be quiet 
to inform us.12Even such social ' phenomena as disco dancin might be 
considered otherwise if the adherents of such sensualism h r:l a better 
grasp of human nature. 
Technology is being viewed these days as the ultimate ·ibunal of 
the nature of things and how they should be treated, whil that same 
technology supposedly offers solutions to human problems \ ccordin! 
to current thinking, it is considered that if something can e done by 
technology, then it should be done. Such matters as artifit I insemin· 
ation come readily to mind. From an artistic capability v jump to a 
moral decision. Children ~e being indoctrinated in the na e tenets of 
19th century optimism in the cult of progress, with the n 1lt that we 
are producing technical barbarians or de-educated mons rs. At the 
same time we are being deceived by such people as jour' 1lists, radio 
announcers, and others of the mass media whom a recer. . article in a 
French newspaper referred to as the "new clergy." 
The utilitarian outlook imposed on us by the adhen · t s of totali· 
tarian doctrine reduces man to the lowest possible value - he becomes 
a useful thing, purely an instrument of society, readily ct; posable if it 
suits society. But two final points need to be made: 
1) one man is worth more than the whole univers•_:, for he will 
continue to exist when the universe is burnt out. Furt~ermo~ 
even in his present state, quite apart from his immortality; ea f 
man has a spiritual substance as one of the t wo principl~s 0 
which he is made up. Hence in the hierarchy of bodilY thJJigs, 
one man is of greater value than all the stars. 
2) The second and final point is that what I have seL down is n.o~ . 
mere fanciful presentation made to fit the order as conce!V it 
by men in keeping with traditional Christian p rinciples! N~ : 1 is laid upon firm foundations and results from t he one t !llc€ 
acceptable to the philosopher- evidence and the evidenof 
· tes 
alone of the sense and the necessary truth of the princiP 
human reason. 
.d. g the 
All these things must be kept in mind when we are dec! .Ul arti· 
answer to serious moral questions such as abortion , euthanasia, 
ficial insemination, and test-tube fertilizations. 
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